Rambam on Omnipotence

Further to last night's shiur, here is the full quote from Rambam regarding G-d's Omnipotence. Rambam clearly writes that G-d is bound by the laws of logic, and that anyone who denies this is only doing so because of religious conviction rather than based on philosophical reasoning.
http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif
It is from Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh Nevuchim) Book III; chapter 15. I am using the Friedlander translation of 1904 (which I know is not very good, but it is available online for free - feel free to check the original Arabic if you are able, or the excellent Hebrew translation by Schwartz)

THAT which is impossible has a permanent and constant property, which is not the result of some agent, and cannot in any way change, and consequently we do not ascribe to God the power of doing what is impossible. No thinking man denies the truth of this maxim; none ignore it, but such as have no idea of Logic. There is, however, a difference of opinion among philosophers with reference to the existence of any particular thing. Some of them consider its existence to be impossible, and hold that God cannot produce the thing in question, whilst others think that it is possible, and that God can create it if He pleases to do so. E.g., all philosophers consider that it is impossible for one substratum to have at the same moment two opposite properties, or for the elementary components of a thing, substance and accident, to interchange, so that the substance becomes accident, and the accident becomes substance, or for a material substance to be without accident. Likewise it is impossible that God should produce a being like Himself, or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself. The power of God is not assumed to extend to any of these impossibilities. But the existence of accidents independent of substance is possible according to one class of philosophers, the Mutazilah, whilst according to others it is impossible; it must, however, be added that those who admit the existence of an accident independent of substance, have not arrived at this conclusion by philosophical research alone: but it was mainly by the desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculation had greatly shaken, that they had recourse to this theory. In a similar manner the creation of corporeal things, otherwise than from a substance, is possible according to our view, whilst the philosophers say that it is impossible. Again, whilst philosophers say that it is impossible to produce a square with a diagonal equal to one of the sides, or a solid angle that includes four right angles, or similar things, it is thought possible by some persons who are ignorant of mathematics, and who only know the words of these propositions, but have no idea of that which is expressed by them. I wonder whether this gate of research is open, so that all may freely enter, and whilst one imagines a thing and considers it possible, another is at liberty to assert that such a thing is impossible by its very nature; or whether the gate is closed and guarded by certain rules, so that we are able to decide with certainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I should also like to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or reason has to examine and test objects as to their being possible or not; likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually, are to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that we consider a thing as physically possible, and then some one objects, or we ourselves fear that our opinion is only the result of imagination, and not that of reason. In such a case it would be desirable to ascertain whether there exists some faculty to distinguish between imagination and intellect, [and if so,] whether this faculty is different from both, or whether it is part of the intellect itself to distinguish between intellectual and imaginary objects. All this requires investigation, but it does not belong to the theme of this chapter.

We have thus shown that according to each one of the different theories there are things which are impossible, whose existence cannot be admitted, and whose creation is excluded from the power of God, and the assumption that God does not change their nature does not imply weakness in God, or a limit to His power. Consequently things impossible remain impossible, and do not depend on the action of an agent. It is now clear that a difference of opinion exists only as to the question to which of the two classes a thing belongs; whether to the class of the impossible, or to that of the possible. Note it.

Also, here is a Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on Omnipotence. Which is very interesting.

Acharei Mot

I kind of cheated here, because in Israel we read Acharei Mot last week, but outside of Israel it will be read this coming week, so it is still relevant (and I didn't give a shiur last week because of Yom HaAtzma'ut).

In this shiur I try to understand the position of Rabbi Abahu, who seems to hold that G-d has the ability to manifest in physical form.
He also seems to be excluding Christianity theologically from Jewish belief.
And I expain why I don't think Rambam can have a neat explanation for Rabbi Abahu (as opposed to all the other statements of Chazal and p'sukim which he can explain).


I look forward to your comments.

Here is the audio shiur (and the pdf sheets to download if you want).

Acharei Mot

(Right click and then 'download as')

Acharei Mot

Your feedback is welcome and appreciated. If anyone is interested in sponsoring a shiur (either l'ilui nishmat someone, or just for no reason) please contact me.

The Nature of G-d

I gave a shiur last night. this shiur is l'ilyi nishmat Menya bas Hertzel.

I discuss two approaches in the Rishonim about how a person should come to understand G-d. Kuzari, Rav Sadiah Gaon, Rambam and others hold that the only way to understand G-d is to use rational thought to investigate His nature. Anyone who speaks about G-d,simply based on what he heard from others or based on the words of Tanach and Chazal, without thinking about the nature of G-d is "still outside the palace".

One case where this is expressed is in Rambam's third principle - that G-d has no physical form. If a person believes the simple words of Tanach or Chazal, without using philosophy to clarify, could come to believe that G-d has a body. Such a belief is heretical according to Rambam.

On the other hand, we find Raavad and Ohr Zaruah who argue that this is not a heretical belief. Furthermore, they both claim that there were many greater than Rambam who held this belief, including (according to Ohr Zaruah) some of Chazal. They explain the reason for this mistaken belief is following the simple reading of Tanach and Aggadata.

I then look at Rav Moshe Taku's book 'Kesav Tamim' where he argues that to deny G-d any physicality is heretical. If G-d is unable to appear in physical form, He is not omnipotent. Furthermore, he claims that Rav Saadiah was the first person to use philosophy to reinterpret the words of Tanach and Chazal and this is not the traditional Jewish view. How can we possibly use our limited logic to understand anything about G-d who is beyond logic?

Rashi also seems to say that G-d can appear in physical form if He wants to. This seems to me the correct reading of Rashi in Sanhedrin, and is explicit by Tosefos Rid in a comment he makes about Rashi.

I think the underlying issue is the omnipotence paradox. Can G-d create a rock which is so big that he cannot lift it?

There have been many answers to this type of question over the past 2000 years. But to simplify - some say that G-d is also bound by the laws of logic. Yet this does not limit His omnipotence. Others say that G-d can do absolutely anything, and the fact that it apears to us to be illogical is not a reason to lmiit G-d's omnipotence.

Rambam, Rav Saadiah etc take the first view. Rav Moshe Taku and Rashi take the second.

Today all Jews know that G-d has no body, and it is heretical to think that He does. Why did the Rambam's view become so pervasive that we cannot even contemplate the alternative? I quote from Rav Profiat Duran, who shows that belief in a physcial G-d is one of the essential differences between Judaism and Christianity. Jews don't believe that G-d could appear in physical form!


Here is the shiur



Or if you prefer to download it here is the link:
Nature of G-d (right click and 'save as')

and here are the source sheets to go with it
Download Source Sheets

If you are interested in sponsoring a shiur please contact me by e-mail.